This paper examines the relation between legal risk-defined as the strength and enforcement of creditors' rights-and debt ownership concentration to understand the various governance roles played by banks as large creditors. Using a sample of 495 project finance loan tranches (worth $151 billion) to borrowers in 61 different countries, we document high absolute levels of debt ownership concentration: the largest single bank holds 20.3% while the top five banks collectively hold 61.2% of a typical loan tranche. We also show that syndicates in countries with weak creditor rights and poor legal enforcement are larger and more diffuse. Based on this finding, we conclude that lenders structure loan syndicates to facilitate monitoring and low-cost re-contracting in countries where creditors have strong and enforceable legal rights. In contrast, lenders attempt to deter strategic defaults by creating larger and more diffuse syndicates when they cannot resort to legal enforcement mechanisms to protect their claims.
Introduction
Using the power of cross-country comparisons, economists have documented a relation between legal rules and such things as corporate ownership, financing policies, and capital allocation. Early work by La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (hereafter, LLSV; shows that common law systems provide stronger investor protection than civil law systems, and that stronger investor protection enables investors to hold smaller equity positions without fearing expropriation by majority shareholders or other insiders. As a result, we observe more diffuse equity ownership structures in countries with stronger investor protection (La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999, Claessens et al., 2000) . Related work shows that stronger investor protection and better legal enforcement results in larger and more efficient capital markets (LLSV, 1997), higher equity values (LLSV 2002 , Claessens et al. 2002 , and faster economic growth (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; Levine, 1999; and Wurgler, 2000) .
Virtually all of this research, however, has focused on shareholder rights, equity ownership, and governance by large shareholders. Yet debt markets have historically provided a much greater percentage of external finance than equity markets, at least in developed countries.
Moreover, one can logically predict that legal rules (creditor rights) and enforcement should also affect debt financing policies. As a first step towards understanding this relation, we analyze how creditor rights and legal enforcement affect the structure of debt ownership using a sample of international syndicated loans. Although there is some theoretical research on the structure of debt ownership and the nature of governance by banks available to guide us, there is relatively little empirical research. 1 In fact, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) note that empirical research on creditor governance is one of the important holes in the corporate governance literature. While our initial objective is to document the structure of debt ownership, our ultimate goal is to improve our understanding of creditor-based governance by exploring the different governance functions banks play and how they vary as a function of country's legal environment.
Researchers assume bank lending improves corporate governance in three ways. First, bankers are expected to monitor borrower performance, and intervene in an effective and timely manner in case borrower non-performance seems likely. Second, concentrated ownership of the debt claim facilitates low-cost, and thus value preserving, re-contracting in the event of default.
Finally, by including a large number of creditors in a loan syndicate, banks can deter voluntary, or strategic, default by making it more costly to do. We focus on these three governance functions because they generate different empirical predictions regarding the relation between syndicate structure and legal risk. By syndicate structure, we mean the concentration and size of lending syndicates; by legal risk, we mean the degree to which creditors have legal rights and can rely on local enforcement. Following LLSV (1998) and other legal scholars (Hoffman, 1998; Walsh, 1999) , we assume that civil law systems provide fewer and weaker creditor rights.
We measure legal enforcement using Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard's (hereafter BPR, 2001) composite legality index. When creditors have fewer rights, face less reliable enforcement, or both, we assume they are exposed to greater legal risk and have a lower probability of achieving a satisfactory return on their invested capital.
We believe there should be a relation between syndicate structure and legal risk, and that this relation will help us understand the governance roles played by banks. As legal risk increases, both the need for monitoring increase, because there are more opportunities for misappropriation of cash flows, and the need for re-contracting increases, because the probability of economic default increases. If either effect is at work, we should observe an increase in syndicate concentration (i.e. fewer banks and larger individual shares). Conversely, if banks are structuring syndicates to deter strategic default, then we should observe a decrease in syndicate concentration as legal risk increases (i.e. more banks and smaller individual shares). By making the syndicates larger, the lenders credibly pre-commit to a more costly restructuring process and to an expanded group of "injured" banks that will be less likely to lend in the future.
We test these hypotheses using a sample of international syndicated loans for projectfinanced transactions. We analyze international loans because they provide the necessary crosssectional heterogeneity of legal systems and enforcement. We analyze syndicated loans because they exhibit a wide range of ownership structures ranging from two or three banks up to 200 banks in a pyramidal structure. Finally, we analyze project finance loans because governance by banks is likely to be more important in this than in other contexts. Project finance is defined by 2 Mullineaux (2000) , Jones, Lang, and Nigro (2000) , and Lee and Mullineaux (2001) .
the creation of a legally independent project company financed with non-recourse debt for the purpose of investing in an industrial asset. The reason governance by banks is important in this context is because project companies are highly leveraged entities-the average project company has a debt debt-to-total capitalization ratio of 70% compared to 30-35% in the average publiclytraded company (Esty, 2002a )-and they get virtually all of their debt in the form of syndicated bank loans. Both collectively and individually, syndicate members are important capital providers, having contributed more capital than most of the individual equity investors (known as sponsors). In addition, we chose to study project finance loans because they are more international than other types of syndicated loans, and because the non-recourse nature of the loan limits the scope of our analysis to the borrower-creditor contracting relationship.
Our sample includes 495 loan tranches worth a total of $151 billion. They come from loans made between 1986 and 2000 to borrowers in 61 different countries. Using univariate analysis, we document high absolute levels of debt ownership concentration. At closing, the largest single debt provider holds an average (median) of 20.3% (14.8%) of the tranche while the top five banks hold an average (median) of 61.2% (57.3%). Although the largest share declines with tranche size, the largest single bank still holds almost 10% of tranches over $500 million.
We also document a significant relation between legal risk and syndicate concentration:
tranches in countries with weaker (stronger) creditor rights or weaker (stronger) legal enforcement exhibit less (more) concentrated ownership structures. Holding all else constant, loan tranches in civil law countries involve 3.2 more banks (for a total of 17.6 banks), compared to 14.4 banks in the average tranche in our sample. This positive relation between creditor rights and debt ownership concentration is particularly interesting because it is the opposite of the negative relation LLS (1999) find between shareholder rights and equity ownership concentration. Similarly, loan tranches in countries with weak legal enforcement such as Turkey contain 8.5 more banks than comparable tranches in countries with stronger legal enforcement such as Australia. These results are more significant in countries with low to medium sovereign risk, which leads us to conclude that legal considerations, rather than concerns about portfolio diversification, are driving our results. Based on this evidence, we conclude that banks act as monitors and providers of low-cost re-contracting in settings where they have stronger legal rights and can rely on legal enforcement to protect their rights and invested capital. As legal risk increases, however, their governance role shifts to one of deterring strategic defaults.
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The paper is organized into four sections. In Section II, we present important institutional details about syndicated lending and the project finance loan market, and describe how this helps us test the relationship between syndicate structure and legal risk. Section III discusses our dataset and provides univariate analyses of creditor rights, enforcement, and syndicate structure variables. Our analysis on the determinants of syndicate structure appears in Section IV. We conclude with a brief discussion of our findings and their implications in Section V.
II. Background Information and Hypotheses
Before presenting our hypotheses, we need to establish some basic facts and terminology about syndicated lending, describe project finance, and define legal risk. A bank syndicate is a collection of banks that jointly extends a loan to a specific borrower. 2 Unlike a loan sale to a third party in which no direct contract exists between the borrower and the buyer, syndication involves a direct contract between each member bank and the borrower (Pennachi,1988; and Gorton and Pennachi, 1995) . Lending syndicates resemble pyramids with arranging banks (arrangers) at the top and providing banks (providers) at the bottom. Prior to closing a loan, the arranging (or mandated) banks meet with the borrower, perform a credit analysis, negotiate key terms and conditions, and prepare an information memorandum for providing banks. Once the key terms are in place, the arranging banks invite other banks to participate in the deal and allocate shares to them as they see fit. 3 The syndication process allows us to assume that syndicate structures are endogenously determined in response to project characteristics including legal risk. After closing, the arranging banks monitor compliance with loan covenants, negotiate contingent agreements when they arise, and lead negotiations in default situations. Because the arranging banks play a more prominent role than providing banks leading up to and after syndication, we focus most of our attention on the arranging banks.
Syndicated loans are the predominant form of funding for project-financed investments.
What makes project companies particularly appropriate for our analysis is that they, perhaps more than almost any other setting, are built on contractual agreements-in fact, some people 2 For a detailed analysis of loan syndication, see Esty's (2001) case study on the Hong Kong Disneyland project. 3 In an underwritten deal, the process works somewhat differently. The arranging banks agree to make the loan, 4 refer to project finance as "contractual finance." Prior to financing a project company, sponsoring firms sign contracts with construction firms, suppliers, customers, and host governments. Lenders, on the other hand, negotiate commitment letters, collateral packages, and loan documents with project companies, and inter-creditor agreements among themselves. This nexus of contracts is intended to ensure loan repayment when the project is solvent and loan recoverability when the project is in default (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Typically, New York or UK law governs the financing contracts. In contrast, the operating contracts and the enforcement of security provisions (e.g., seizure of collateral upon default) depend on the legal system in the country where the project is located. As a result, lenders must understand their rights as creditors and the efficiency of local enforcement before lending in a given country.
In practice, countries vary considerably in terms of the rights they grant creditors and the efficiency with which they respect property rights and enforce contract law. For example, there is a well documented difference between civil law and common law jurisdictions in terms of investor protection. Coffee (2000) argues that common law systems provide greater flexibility to address new unforeseen situations because civil law systems are restricted to the body of current laws. Consistent with this view, LLSV (1998) show that common law countries provide stronger legal protection for both shareholders and creditors. In the context of project finance, Hoffman (1998, pp. 76-77) notes that common law countries provide greater leeway in the types of collateral that can be seized in default situations and the types of liens that can be placed on assets. 4 Resolving these differences, particularly when the financing documents and the collateral agreements are governed by different legal systems, is time consuming and complex. Esty (2000) , in his case study of the Mozal project (a $1.4 billion aluminum smelter in Mozambique), notes that resolving legal differences between Mozambique (civil law), England (common law), and South Africa (common law) was one of the major structuring challenges.
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and later attempt to syndicate it to providing banks in a process known as general syndication. 4 For similar reasons, Walsh (1999, p. 125) concludes, "…civil law jurisdictions restrict the security rights available to project lenders…In contrast to the civil law, the common law offers a far more expedient approach to securing assets." As an example, civil law countries generally forbid "floating liens," do not permit mortgages to be registered in a foreign currency, and forbid foreign entities from operating or purchasing foreclosed assets. Penrose and Rigby (2000, p. 60) , two S&P analysts, claim that, "In many countries, the notion of contract supported debt remains a novelty. Little case law or civil law, for instance, exists to support the assignment of contracts to lenders as collateral. The legal system may not support the Western-style contracts so typical in project finance."
In addition to ensuring they have legal rights, creditors must also ensure their rights are enforceable. According to Moody's (2001, pp. 47, 48 
A. Hypotheses Relating Syndicate Structure and Legal Risk
We hypothesize that legal risk affects the way banks perform their primary governance functions, and that banks will adjust syndicate structure in response to legal risk to facilitate their various governance roles. According to previous research, banks have three primary governance functions. First, as described in Diamond (1984) and Fama (1985) , they provide valuable monitoring services. Subsequent empirical research by James (1987) , Lummer and McConnell (1989) , and Dahiya, Puri, and Saunders (2001) on the returns associated with new loan agreements, and by De Long (1991) and Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991) on the relation between firm performance and bank finance, validates the effectiveness of bank monitoring.
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Second, they facilitate low-cost re-contracting in the event of default. Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) and Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) present theoretical models showing that small groups of banks are able to restructure firms faster and more cheaply than large groups of public bondholders can. Consistent with these models, Gilson, John, and Lang (1990) report that the time and cost of restructuring increases as the number of creditors increases, yet declines documents were governed by UK common law, but enforcement ran through Polish civil law. One difference between the two systems was that Polish law did not allow interest on interest in default situations.
with the fraction of bank debt. Further research by Preece and Mullineaux (1996) shows that the positive abnormal return associated with new bank loan announcements is negatively related to syndicate size, which they assert shows that increased renegotiation costs gradually offset monitoring benefits as syndicate size increases. Low-cost re-structuring is very important in the context of project finance because projects involve dedicated assets with going concern, but little salvage value. As a result, asset liquidations are rare and restructurings are the norm (see Hoffman, 1998, p. 656) . Knowing that restructuring is the likely course for a defaulted project, lenders rationally structure syndicates to minimize restructuring costs. Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) aptly point out that low restructuring costs can, perversely, encourage borrowers to default strategically. Lenders can discourage strategic defaults by intentionally making such discretionary acts very costly to the borrowers. One way to discourage strategic default is to increase the number of creditors in a syndicate, thereby creating a more costly restructuring process and pre-committing to imposing costs on the strategic defaulter (Gertner and Scharfstein, 1991; Diamond, 1991; and Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996) . A second way to make default more costly is to impose a penalty on defaulting firms. In
Chowdry's (1991) model of sovereign lending, banks threaten to withhold future lending. He assumes that banks can credibly commit not to lend in the future (after a default) only if they have previously lost money to a particular borrower. Thus, as you increase syndicate size, you reduce the pool of potential creditors willing to lend to a defaulting borrower at some point in the future. Of course, the defaulting borrower must depend on external finance for this threat to be credible. For projects with little on-going funding needs, this form of deterrence may be less effective. It may, however, be effective against sponsoring firms that rely on external finance to fund their capital expenditures.
We focus on these three governance functions-monitoring, re-contracting, and deterrence-because they generate different empirical predictions regarding the relation between syndicate structure and legal risk. To test for such a relation, we present three hypotheses, though readily admit that observed structures represent complex combinations of these and other factors. The monitoring hypothesis predicts that banks will hold larger shares, resulting in smaller and more concentrated syndicates, when monitoring is needed and valuable. Banks with larger positions have less incentive to free ride on the monitoring of others. While we expect monitoring to be more important in countries with high legal risk-there is greater opportunity 7 for misappropriation of cash flow-there is an offsetting effect: banks have fewer legal rights and cannot rely on enforcement. Thus we expect more concentrated lending syndicates in countries with low legal risk where detection of problems can lead to corrective actions through legal mechanisms. In countries with high legal risk, however, the empirical prediction is not clear. Nevertheless, an increase in syndicate concentration particularly among the arranging banks would be consistent with an attempt to improve monitoring incentives. The low-cost recontracting hypothesis similarly predicts that banks will choose more concentrated loan syndicates to reduce re-contracting costs when the probability of economic default is higher. By definition, low-cost re-contracting is similar to monitoring in that it relies on the existence of legal rights and the enforcement of contracts. For this reason, we predict more concentrated syndicates in countries with low legal risk, and would view a positive relation between increases in legal risk and debt ownership concentration as being consistent with the re-contracting hypothesis (as well as the monitoring hypothesis). Finally, the deterrence hypothesis predicts the opposite: there should be a negative relation between legal risk and debt ownership concentration. Banks, knowing they have few legal rights and cannot rely on local enforcement, attempt to deter strategic default by making it more costly to default. They can make voluntary default costly by choosing more diffuse ownership structures. Of course, lenders must be mindful of the potential for economic defaults in which case they themselves will bear the incremental restructuring costs. This concern, combined with the fixed costs of underwriting a loan, prevents them from expanding the syndicate size (or decreasing the concentration) too far.
III. Data and Methodology
Our sample of syndicated loans comes from Capital Data's (now Dealogic) Loanware database, which contains information on more than 85,000 syndicated loan tranches made between 1980 and April 2000. 7 We begin with the 6,505 loan tranches designated as project finance loans, and then apply three screens to obtain the final sample. First, we exclude all bilateral loans-loans between a single bank and a borrower. Second, we exclude tranches less than $75 million as a way to limit the sample size because all of the data must be hand collected. 8 We also Given the reported dollar investment made by each bank at closing, we manually calculate several concentration measures for each tranche, including the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 9 , the share of the five largest participating banks (five-bank concentration ratio, CR5), the largest single bank share (CR1), and the total share held by arranging banks. We define arrangers to include any bank that is listed as a mandated arranger, arranger, or coarranger in the database. Because Loanware reports syndicate structure as of the closing date, we are unable to track what happens to ownership after the loan has closed. 10 As part of this process, we calculate syndicate size in terms of the number of total banks, number of arranging banks, and number of providing banks. Finally, we collect information on loan pricing, loan characteristics (signing date, tranche size, maturity, whether the loan was secured or guaranteed, 8 Altman and Suggitt (2000) use a $100 million threshold in their analysis of syndicated loan default rates. 9 The HHI is given by the formula where S i is the dollar share of the i th bank. Other studies of corporate governance use the Herfindahl index to measure the concentration of control rights (see, for example, Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; or Gorton and Schmid, 2000) . and whether it was a refinancing), and project characteristics (industrial sector and location). To control for sovereign risk, we collect the most recent Institutional Investor country credit rating (II RATING) prior to closing-the scale runs from zero (high risk) to 100 (low risk).
Institutional Investor publishes ratings twice per year based on a survey of international bankers.
11 The ratings are forward-looking estimates of sovereign debt capacity and repayment probabilities. As a word of caution, it is important to remember that the II RATING is an inverse scale so that country risk decreases as the II RATING increases. (2000) analysis of syndicated lending, we find that project loans are predominantly international credits, yet the U.S. and U.K. account for 15.1% and 9.5%, respectively, of the number of loans in our final sample. Although our sample corresponds to the full database of PF loans, we are somewhat surprised at the relative absence of loans from South American projects.
**** Insert Table 1 about here **** For our final sample, we gather data on the legal rules and enforcement in the countries where the projects are located. We measure creditor and shareholder (anti-director) rights using LLSV's (1998 LLSV's ( , 1999 indices. The creditor rights index runs from 0 (weak protection) to 4 (strong), 12 but suffers from two problems: it is based on a single point in time and it yields some counter-intuitive results. For example, the US, Canada, and Australia are classified as having weak creditor rights while South Korea, Indonesia, and Egypt are classified as having the strongest creditor rights. A more general classification scheme based on legal origin-common vs. civil law-yields more intuitive results and is more consistent with legal research on creditor rights: the US, Canada, and Australia are all common law countries while South Korea, Indonesia and Egypt are civil law countries. We measure the strength of a country's legal system using BPR's (2001) legality index, which is a summary statistic from a principal components analysis on five measures of legal enforcement: effectiveness of the judiciary, rule signaling effects associated with selling down loans they originated. In general, trading is relatively infrequent. 11 This rating is based on assessments from 75 to 100 leading international banks. The responses are weighted by a formula that gives greater weight to banks with more global exposure and better country analysis systems.
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12 LLSV (1998, p. 1135) award one point if there is no automatic stay on assets, secured creditors get paid first, there are restrictions on reorganizations, and if management does not stay in reorganizations.
of law, risk of contract repudiation, absence of corruption, and risk of expropriation. The index runs from 8.51 for the Philippines to 21.91 for Switzerland, and covers the same 49 countries in the LLSV (1998) analysis.
Having described the data and defined the key variables, we now present summary statistics. Table 2 presents four panels describing project characteristics, legal environment, syndicate structure, and loan pricing variables. To illustrate the importance of size effects, we report results for all 495 loan tranches greater than $75 million in size and for the 74 loan tranches greater than $500 million in size. 
B. Legal Risk Variables
Panel B of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for our creditor rights and enforcement indices. The LLSV (1998) creditor rights index shows that the average score is 2.4 on a scale from 0 to 4. Larger tranches tend to be in countries with stronger creditor rights: the median index is 3.0 compared to 2.0 for the full sample. When it comes to the shareholder rights index, 11 both the means (3.8 for the full sample, 4.1 for the larger loans) and medians (4.0 and 4.1) are approximately equal. Finally, the BPR legality index has an average score of 17.6 and a standard deviation of 4.0, which indicates there is significant heterogeneity across our sample in terms of enforcement. Larger projects tend to be located in countries with stronger legal enforcement.
C. Syndicate Structure Variables
Panel C of Table 2 presents a description of syndicate structure. We find that debt ownership is highly concentrated. On average, the single largest bank holds an average (median) of 20.3% of the tranche (14.8%), the five largest banks hold 61.2% (57.3 %), and the average Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is 14.9% (10.25%). It is not necessarily surprising that the top 5 banks cluster near 60% because waivers of loan terms typically requires approval from banks controlling at least 60% of the outstanding principal. When you consider that loan tranches represent on average 47.8% of total project capital, the largest single lender is providing almost 10% of the total capital provided by all banks. In dollar terms, the largest single bank holds an average of $61.7 million while the top five banks hold a total of $186.0 million.
There are noticeable size effects across the two samples: the single largest (top five) bank share declines from 20.3% (61.2%) for all tranches greater than $75 million to 9.6% (36.7%) for the tranches greater than $500 million. With regard to the average arranger share, it falls from 16.7% to 7.0% as you move from the full sample to the largest tranches. What is more surprising is the fact that the total arranger share does not decline much as size increases: the average total arranger share falls from 39.2% to 34.2%. The reason total arranger share is relatively invariant to size is that the number of arrangers increases from 3.6 banks in the average tranche to 5.8 banks in the largest tranches.
D. Loan Pricing Variables
Panel D of In summary, this analysis shows that projects are highly leveraged transactions, that project debt is highly concentrated, and that size has a major effect on debt ownership
concentration. The analysis also shows there is significant heterogeneity in both legal and sovereign risk as well as in syndicate structures. We now attempt to explain the determinants of syndicate structure using regression analysis, with particular attention being paid to the role of creditor rights and enforcement efficiency.
IV. The Determinants of Syndicate Structure
This section examines the relation between syndicate structure, creditor rights, and legal enforcement using two sets of Tobit regressions. In the first set of regressions, we use syndicate concentration as the dependent variable. We measure concentration in six ways: Herfindahl Index, largest single bank share, combined share of the top five banks, total arranging bank share, average arranging bank share, and average providing bank share (we do not include total providing bank share because it is the complement of total arranging bank share). whether a project contains a long-term, off-take (purchase) contract or a fixed-price, turnkey construction contract has a major effect on the overall level of risk. The Loanware database does not include this information nor can we get it from the proprietary loan documents supporting 13 The nature of project finance largely precludes investment-related distortions such as risk shifting or under-14 each deal. The fact that most project companies are private (not listed) firms severely hinders data collection. To address this problem, we create a new variable using the loan spread to measure residual project risk. We first regress the loan spread on all of the independent variables using an OLS specification (results not shown), and then calculate a LOAN PRICING RESIDUAL for use in the Tobit regressions on syndicate structure. The idea is that the regression residual will be a proxy for unobserved project risk: high positive residuals indicate high, unmitigated project risk. In an attempt to distinguish between sovereign and project risk,
we include the II RATING as a measure of sovereign risk in both the loan pricing and syndicate structure regressions. We also include a dummy variable for tranches in the US because they account for 15.2% of our sample, and because the US has a large bond market available for borrowers. Similar dummy variables for tranches in other countries are not significant.
Although we run Tobit regressions that treat the independent variables as exogenous, several of them, particularly the tranche variables, are likely to endogenous. As robustness checks, we run a series of simultaneous equation regressions with up to three dependent variables (maturity, loan pricing, and syndicate structure). Despite lacking truly exogenous variables, which are needed to identify the equations, the regressions (results not shown) produce coefficients that are similar in sign, magnitude, and significance to the results in our Tobit regressions presented below. We also run the Tobit regressions with just the country and legal risk variables, the ones most likely to be exogenous. Again the results (not shown) are similar. Table 2 ). The II RATING variable is negative and highly significant in all but one regression. Given this variable's scale (high ratings imply low sovereign risk), a negative coefficient means that ownership concentration increases in countries with high sovereign risk, and that the arranging banks hold larger shares of riskier loans.
A. Syndicate Concentration and Legal Risk
Perhaps more interestingly, we see that even the providing banks hold larger shares of loans in riskier countries. While limited lending capacity in high-risk markets could explain this finding, it is consistent with other research on syndicated lending. Simons (1993) , Dennis and Mullineaux (2000), and Jones, Lang, and Nigro (2000) find that arranging banks retain larger shares of riskier syndicated loans, and attribute this finding to agency concerns about adverse selection. 16 Gorton and Pennachi (1995) find the same thing in the case of loan sales.
Apparently, reputation alone is not sufficient to mitigate concerns about adverse selection. 17 Our finding of greater concentration and larger individual loan shares in high-risk countries is not consistent with a diversification motive. Table 4 presents the results on the relation between syndicate size and creditor rights, and largely mirrors the results in Table 3 . Using a similar Tobit specification, we find that the regressions have a high degree of explanatory power: the chi-square statistics are all significant at the 1% level. The CIVIL LAW (weak creditor rights) dummy variable is positively related to the number of total banks and providing banks, but negatively related to the number of arranging banks. In other words, syndicates are larger in civil law countries because there are more providing banks. On average, tranches in civil law countries contain 3.2 more total banks (4.8
B. Syndicate Size and Legal Risk
16 Increasing ownership also resolves adverse selection problems in equity transactions (see Leland and Pyle, 1977; Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994; and Lerner, 1994) . 17 While the evidence is consistent with agency explanations, we cannot distinguish between adverse selection or moral hazard as a motivating force. If we had post-closing ownership data, e.g. after any sell-down had occurred, then we might be able to distinguish between the two explanations. Adverse selection would predict high original ownership while moral hazard would predict high on-going ownership. more providing banks) than an equivalent tranche in a common law country. Considering the average tranche has 14.4 banks (see Table 2 ), this represents a 22% increase in the total number of banks. Similarly, weak enforcement results in larger syndicates. Moving from Australia with a rating of 20.44 to Turkey with an index rating of 11.84 increases the total number of banks by 8.4 banks. This represents a 58% increase in syndicate size. **** Insert Table 4 about here **** This evidence is again consistent with only the deterrence function. In countries with weak creditor rights or weak enforcement, syndicates are larger and banks hold smaller shares.
Clearly this increase in syndicate size runs contrary to a desire to facilitate low-cost recontracting. The results also appear to refute the monitoring hypothesis. At first, the finding that there are fewer arranging banks in situations with weak creditor rights appears to be consistent with a desire to enhance monitoring incentives-having fewer lead banks (arrangers) would reduce free-riding. The arrangers, however, hold smaller shares in these settings ( Table 3 shows the average arranger share falls by 5.7% off an average holding of 16.7%, see Table 2 ), which would reduce monitoring incentives. Once again, this evidence seems most consistent with the idea that banks monitor when monitoring can be effective (i.e. in low legal risk settings), and resort to deterrence in situations where legal recourse is in doubt.
An alternative interpretation of the negative (positive) relation between legal risk and syndicate size (concentration) is that lenders structure syndicates to diversify their exposure to legal risk rather than to deter strategic defaults. Because the results reflect a net, not a gross, benefit of a given syndicate structure, both factors are certainly relevant, and we cannot definitively distinguish between them. We address this issue first indirectly by examining sovereign risk and then directly by examining legal risk. To begin with, the results are not consistent with banks attempting to diversification away sovereign risk. In fact, both arranger loan shares and overall concentration increase, and portfolio size decreases, as sovereign risk increases (II rating falls). Interestingly, even providing banks, the ones presumably most interested in diversification because they are smaller, hold larger shares of riskier loans (see Table 3 )-we discuss the possibility of capacity constraints in the next section.
Additional evidence against a pure diversification explanation for the observed positive relation between legal risk and syndicate size comes from the impact of multi-lateral agency 18 participation in a loan. Given the positive relation between syndicate concentration and sovereign risk documented above, one would expect the presence of a multi-lateral agency (AGENCY PARTICIPATION dummy variable) to reduce sovereign risk and, therefore, reduce concentration. Yet the opposite happens: there are fewer banks and they hold larger positions when an agency also participates in a transaction. In contrast, one would expect this result based on deterrence motives. Multi-lateral agencies such as the IFC and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), as lenders of last resort, deter strategic defaults and help resolve complicated legal issues. In other words, they lower legal risk and reduce the need for syndicate-based deterrence. Consistent with our findings on the effects of creditor rights and enforcement, agency participation results in greater concentration.
To verify this result, we reran the regressions in Tables 3 and 4 after eliminating the tranches in high-risk countries (the bottom quartile). The negative relation between legal risk and syndicate concentration is significant for the low-and medium-risk countries, but insignificant for the high-risk countries. Finally, we examine the magnitude of the changes to shed light on the diversification vs. deterrence question. In civil law countries, syndicates contain up to 50% more providing banks. This dramatic increase in size complicates restructuring efforts. In contrast, the average providing bank cuts its holdings by $5.5 million compared to an average holding of $28.3 million-a 19% decline. For the large banks that participate in the syndicated loan market, the diversification benefits resulting from a relatively small reduction in loan amounts, especially compared to a multi-billion dollar loan portfolio, seem small compared to the deterrence benefits created by increasing the syndicate size by 20-50%. Nevertheless, we believe the net change incorporates both deterrence and diversification effects.
Of the remaining variables, the coefficients on SIZE are negative and significant (larger tranches include more banks), on MATURITY are negative and significant (longer maturity tranches have more banks), and on the US dummy variable are negative and significant (US tranches are smaller). Consistent with earlier results, we observe a positive coefficient on II RATING at least in Regressions #1 and #3. Holding creditor rights and enforcement constant, this finding implies smaller syndicates in countries with higher levels of sovereign risk. One interpretation of this finding is that projects exposed to higher levels of sovereign risk may be more subject to liquidity defaults, caused by temporary imbalances between cash inflows and 19 outflows. As a result, bankers want to ensure rapid approval of covenant waivers in the event of minor problems or low-cost restructuring in the event of more serious problems.
C. Sensitivity Analysis
We run sensitivity analyses to ensure the results in Tables 3 and 4 Although we believe our secondary finding-that syndicates are smaller and more concentrated in countries with greater sovereign risk-is largely due to agency and recontracting concerns, an alternative explanation based on restricted lending capacity in high-risk countries could also explain this finding. Because lending to projects in high-risk countries is a complex activity requiring specialized underwriting skills, only a limited number of banks participate in this market. By necessity, syndicates are smaller and more concentrated in these markets.
We test the capacity hypothesis in several ways. 21 19 The number 211 is an understatement of the actual number of arrangers because the Loanware database treats merged banks as a single bank rather than two banks, and there have been numerous bank mergers during the 1990s. Unfortunately, if you fail to correct for mergers, the database does not consolidate subsidiaries into bank holding companies either. As a result, Chase New York and Chase Hong Kong appear as separate arrangers. concentration and sovereign risk is the result of concerns about adverse selection and low-cost re-contracting. This assertion is consistent with not only our findings, but also the findings in related work on syndication in other settings.
V. Summary and Conclusions
This paper examines the relationship between creditor rights, legal enforcement, and syndicate structure in the global market for syndicated project finance loans as a way to improve our understanding of the governance role played by large creditors in general and banks in particular. We find that debt ownership is highly concentrated, and significantly more concentrated than equity ownership in most US industrial firms. While it is true that debt does not have the control rights associated with equity, except in default scenarios, the structure of debt ownership affects monitoring incentives, re-contracting costs, and deterrence effectiveness, three functions traditionally associated with bank debt. Second, we show that debt ownership concentration (syndicate size) is positively (negatively) related to the strength of creditor rights and the reliability of legal enforcement after controlling for loan size, sovereign risk, and project risk. These findings are consistent with the idea that banks monitor and provide low-cost recontracting when they have strong legal rights and can rely on enforcement mechanisms, but resort to deterrence through costly re-contracting when they possess few legal rights or cannot rely on local enforcement.
We view these results as an initial foray into two, largely unexplored realms of financecreditor governance and syndicated lending-and believe more research is needed on both 
